German ECR MEP Lars Patrick Berg has issued a call warning for more awareness about the expansion of IS in Africa.
He stated:
“The swift expansion of the so-called “Islamic State” in Africa should worry European politicians. We must tackle this problem, before it is too late.”
https://t.co/Cc37XNXENq pic.twitter.com/qRcUI59HqH
— Lars Patrick Berg MdEP (@L_P_Berg) September 13, 2022
Deutsche Welle reports that in Nigeria, “unrest and violence flare up again and again due to the brutal attacks by the Islamist terrorist militia Boko Haram, which has been fighting for an Islamic state in north-eastern Nigeria since 2009. A few days ago, Ali Ndume, the chairman of the Senate’s army committee, called for a state of emergency to be declared. The Nigerian military is underfunded and understaffed to fight the growing insecurity in Nigeria, the senator said.”
American Enterprise Institute scholars Katherine Zimmerman and Kate Chesnutt have meanwhile published an analysis looking at more detail at the expansion of Islamic State in Africa:
“Salafi-jihadi groups have expanded rapidly in Africa. They have sustained local attack cells and broader insurgencies by capitalizing on local instability and governments’ inability to provide security and services, including drought and famine response.
In East Africa, al Shabaab’s insurgency in Somalia endures. Al Shabaab controls significant parts of south-central Somalia and has escalated attacks in the capital region since early 2022. It capitalized on diminished counterterrorism pressure caused by the withdrawal of US troops in 2021. Pressure on al Shabaab has increased since the reinsertion of US forces in May 2022, but its gains will take time to reverse. Additionally, al Shabaab conducted two military incursions into Ethiopia in summer 2022, indicating an intent to expand regionally. The Somali Islamic State province is relatively small but serves as an intermediary and financial hub for multiple Islamic State branches. It links the Islamic State’s central and east African provinces to Islamic State leadership in Iraq and Syria and transmits funds to Afghanistan via Yemen.
In May 2022, Islamic State leadership declared the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) and the Islamic State in Mozambique (ISM) autonomous, rather than two wings of the same province. Both ISM and ISCAP may benefit from their connection to IS leadership, which may push them to focus on a broader regional approach or increase their emphasis on external operations.
Since 2020, ISM has been engaged in an insurgency in northern Mozambique. Mozambican, Rwandan, and Southern African Development Community forces dislodged ISM from key towns in 2021, but ISM has relocated, expanded its activities elsewhere in the region—including increasing cross-border attacks into Tanzania—and encouraged fighters to melt into civilian communities until called on.
In northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, ISCAP has pursued a low-level insurgency for several years, prompting the declaration of martial law in two provinces in 2021. Ugandan and Congolese forces engaged in a concerted counterterrorism effort in late 2021 and early 2022, prompted by ISCAP attacks in Uganda, but ISCAP’s frequency of attacks has held steady. Over the past two years, ISCAP has effectively doubled its area of operation, increased its operational tempo, and attracted more foreign fighters. It has also freed upward of 2,000 prisoners in major prison breaks since 2020.
The global reduction in counterterrorism resources has also lifted pressure from many Salafi-jihadi groups, writes @KatieZimmerman. Compare the 2021 and 2022 scorecards for #alQaeda and #ISIS. https://t.co/oB0CKKuyEi pic.twitter.com/aac5SN9wdU
— Critical Threats (@criticalthreats) September 9, 2022
In North Africa, the Islamic State Sinai Province (ISSP) continues to conduct attacks against gas pipelines and the Egyptian armed forces but has declined in strength due to persistent Egyptian counterterrorism pressure and the resolution of underlying local grievances. The leader of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) remains in Algeria, but its focus has been the success of its subordinate affiliates in the Sahel, primarily Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM). AQIM appears to operate as a link to al Qaeda’s global leadership and a financial and ideological facilitator, although it has not exhibited significant independent operational capacity in recent years.
In West Africa, JNIM has embedded itself in communities in central Mali, providing aspects of governance, including administering justice, brokering interethnic peace deals, and imposing taxes. From this stronghold, it launched a series of attacks in southern Mali in summer 2022 and actively threatens security in Bamako, Mali’s capital. The withdrawal of French forces from Mali and possible further easing of counterterrorism pressure will permit JNIM to further entrench itself in central and northern Mali. JNIM previously expanded into Burkina Faso and has attack cells in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Togo. JNIM’s population-centric approach better positions it to gain local support compared to its local Salafi-jihadi rival, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), known for its brutality.
In March, the Islamic State declared ISGS an autonomous province, recognizing it as the Islamic State Sahel Province. The group has struggled due to leadership attrition. Malian pressure and intergroup competition have forced ISGS to reevaluate current approaches, including agreeing to a truce with JNIM. But ISGS remains an active operator in Mali’s embattled eastern provinces and a major threat to civilians in western Niger and northern Burkina Faso.
In northeastern Nigeria, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) has absorbed or eclipsed much of Boko Haram, the group from which it originally splintered. Over the past year, ISWAP has increased in operational tempo and audacity, including a large-scale prison break in July 2022 on the outskirts of Abuja, Nigeria’s capital. Its insurgency in the northeast is ongoing, but a rise in operations in central Nigeria indicates it has begun to build networks and capacity outside of its current strongholds.
In northwestern Nigeria, al Qaeda–linked Ansaru appears to be making a resurgence after several years of dormancy. The group confirmed its loyalty to AQIM. Although it is not yet a major threat, its ascendency indicates growing al Qaeda influence in the region. It appears to be pursuing a population-centric strategy and has adopted the banditry tactics common to other militant groups in northern Nigeria.
https://www.aei.org/articles/the-state-of-al-qaeda-and-isis-around-the-world/